Tuesday, 11 October 2016


Religions are conscious systems for being and/or seeming trustworthy for specific or general contexts. For that purpose they tend to promote attitudes of benefit for those inclined for adequacy for reason about reasoning about religion. In that they are more or less iteratively self-promoting.

But there are other systems of ethics that do the above, I think. The difference seems to me to be that at the same time religions are also built upon emphasis-type seduction.But this type of seduction is probably only in the background, in the sense that it's what has established them to become popular in the sense they are. In the spirit of the religions themselves, that seduction is hardly appreciated (at least nowadays, I think). Instead there is a focus on their functionality for trustworthiness, as described above.

There are in the largest religions some examples of this, I think:
  • Christianity is the way I see it the most influential religion in this world. It is based on Judaism (which I will discuss later), a member of which tried, I think, to alter. But rather than altering his own religion he started a new one. Why, one might ask. My answer to that is that it is because he invented a soul beneficiary system of altruism for the sake of a soul, in which memory is spared from much criticism if it is inclined for such altruism.

    Later, it seems, probably about 500 AD or so, someone faked that such altruism should be influenced by a soul beneficiary system that indulges in exploiting utilitarian notions and thoughts for rendering soul ambition be self-sufficiently adequate for supremacy. In this the new religion turned against the Judaism from which it had sprung. Or the infiltration was perhaps earlier than I first thought, for example by roman emperor Constantine, as described here. Either way, I suspect, but I'm not sure, that those who believe very much in that form of Christianity are the Illuminati  - Right?!?

  • Because Judaism is, I believe, about one or two things. The very most basic one of them seems to be to have it utilitarianism aught to be of cunning that can sort out evils to be exploited for the benefit of (at least seemingly) everyone. But, my guess is with Moses or so, there came to it another soul beneficiary thought to it. This one seems to be about scrutinizing the spirit with remediation that leads to more remediation of it. This often  -  though not necessarily  - renders a spirit be more or less altruistic.

  • Islam I believe to be about scrutinizing, to some extent, about one or both of Christianity's two soul beneficiary systems, for the sake of also scrutinizing against clarity on how evil could stay peaceful.

  • Buddhims seems to be about letting utilitarianism exploit itself so that it can avoid being exploited by evil or so, in that it very much seems to lead to that utilitarianism has a notion of altruism to it.

  • Hindusim, from which Buddhism has sprung, seems to me to be about rendering utilitarianism self-sufficient about pertaining to supremacy.
What I above has called utilitarianism, I have in other contexts called homogeneity or so, and referred to it as a series of numbers that originate from nine, and continues with nineteen as its initial sense. What I there have called care for the soul or so, I have also often called other things, apart from moreover referred to as the series that starts from sixteen, with forty-seven as its initial sense.These mathematical expressions are much more of always the same, if I use them at al, while words and names can change a whole lot. ...

Friday, 7 October 2016

Logic and so

In my view of things, it is not without order that one can have a model for an absolute notion of something. There is in the order of logic  -  and numbers  -  an absolute notion of order itself. Furthermore, I think most will agree that rational numbers contain more order than irrational ones, and whole numbers even more. For this reason I have created the number system I present on this blog.

In this system,order itself can be more or less well defined. So far I haven't done it very well I'm afraid. But to it all comes that part of my belief, about how whole numbers work, is that the potential one factor in each of them can be of direct utilitarianism, two of broken such utilitarianism and three of broken such breakage of utilitarianism. Indeed, any plus sign between whole numbers is about a breakage, and each breakage can be about creating a new category. In this a one category, without breakage is about total utilitarianism of that direct kind. The potential one factor in any whole number can thus lead to a potential utilitarianism about the qualities of these whole numbers, and thus about the categorizations that they can create.

Order is sort of quite stringent already in threeness, destiny, since three has a discrepancy against discrepancy. Three to a power of two moreover evades the plain discrepancies. In the process both these anti-discrepancy tendencies are also anti-discriminatory. The result is thereby something like utilitarianism, in the sense that it brings back the one.

In the three of destiny there is however, an achorage of the third combinanation number, which is eight (after four and six). But eight, in being 2^3 reresents discrepency that spites three, because the connections between the two are anti-categorical. This spite against three, i.e. against the sureness of constant discrepency against discrapency must,  probably, be counteracted for achievement of strict logic.

But, in order to avoid that discrepency against discreency is ever only half-way, all good thoughts, include spirituality or utalitarianism (described here). But to usual thoughts, ther is also an imprtant element of saying to oneself that one is not sure. It is thereby that ordinary thoughts rely upon both sureness (by that discrepency is set to counteract itself) that spites unsureness, i.e. homogeneity (nine and what it preludes, such as nineteen), and also on discrepency that spites such sureness, thus yielding heterogeneity (eight and what it preludes, such as seventeen). In other words, the logic and imagination are intertwined and tolerate each other, making the logic not be strictlylogic.

Thereby I think logic is about such utilitarianism with a blatancy against what I've been calling heterogeneity (i.e. imagination and so). Sureness is in logic emphassized to be something better, more stable than imagination. Such emphasis is done with what I call a meaning step. It's the meaning step from eleven to twenty-nine that is closest at hand for such emphasis against three.

But, there's a problem with that, as ther eis also with cynicism! The eleven and the twenty-nine are part of the series of hardening discrepencies, i.e. of the second series, the one that starts from six. The six represents three and two viewed as sort of the same, i.e. simplification by discrepency as the same as discrepency against itself. This mixes sfe and unsefe assumptions in dangerous ways.

The second series also relates back to two, to inclininations of discrepency, including those that create injustice, and also those that create illusions. The second step of it, twenty-nine, hardens discrepency very much. Indeed I have been calling it plain evil.

I hope I use more of a ninetyone for the logic I try to achieve. That focus on eight, as two times four, is less cynical. I'm not sure, by now, however, how much can be used of what for what. ...

As I have had it before, logic is something of that has been somewhat distorted  -  by superficiality, or so. But now I believe that is not so. Rather that corruption of homogeneity is probably part of all sorts of sexuality that leads to promiscuous thinking and so, because that leads often also to corrupt homogeneity  -  including corrupt logic  -  and so.

It is not necessary for there to be any virtue for there to be logic. Also there should be no need for hypocrisy. Thereby  -  although it might seem weird to you in the beginning  -  the seduction into neglect should be done by association to the the simplest means for it, which happens to be what I have called 'plain evil'. See further where the seduction link in the last paragraph.

It is not needed for the 'plain evil' to be self-sufficient, for logic to work, I think   -  indeed I'm very sure I don't do it that way! To be sure logic works I just see to it that there is, at least sort of, an incitement for having to regard evil as quite possible. I also assume I can help myself to even so stay creative enough to see others' sides of situations and possibilities  -  potentially also, though absolutely not only, imaginary others. But this is because creativity can learn to adapt itself to be fairly good at surviving plain-evil-based corruption of it

But such corruption of heterogeneity can lead to not seeing the other side of that. The essence of such corruption is twenty-nine, which by its specification of heterogeneity (eight), which corrupts it from rendering it seem okay to pretend good is evil, of sorts. Because it is usually into having evil be into resurrecting itself to be good. This can be  -  at least somewhat well  -  seen in its structure of it as two to a power of three, interpreted as two that can counteract three (which stands for reciprocity) but that if that anti-three tendency is not relied upon for essential changes unless three itself is used to anchor it.

Anyway, twenty-nine is also an essence of enhancing prejudice. Homogeneity, in the sense talked about here, which is otherwise quite sophisticated against prejudice, annuls this essence to at least some extent. But in the process the utilitarianism-based positive attitude in homogeneity is annulled by the twenty-nine. Such an attitude can be seen in for example the religious systems that use enhancement of utilitarianism as their essence of enhancing trustworthiness and so.

A twenty-nine is severely counteracted, usually, most of all by that the basic specification against it is cruel; it is thirty-two, which is 2^5. Thereby it is hardly about five (spirit) at all, that the twenty-nine can be, upon being specified, in the most standard way, which (as is with standard specifications) is very commonplace. Thereby it is also commonplace to view essence of enhancing to be counteracted more or less easily when trying to do it by use of twenty-nine.

Due mostly to this, virtually only an at least sort of more or less self-specifying (i.e. memory-wise) twenty nine is smart at being able to be the essence it can be of enhancing prejudice, which although evil, I think, can be interesting as an issue. One indirect way of being memory wise for it is to specify the thirty two it can be specified by, which it can to together with a thirteen. That is twenty-nine specifies eight and thirteen four, which if put together as factors yields thirty-two. This specification by twenty-nine is the most dangerous prejudice enhancer there is.

It can be counteracted by logic, in that the essence of twenty-nine times nineteen works well against that a thirteen factor be active with a twenty-nine. This happens because thirteen times twenty-nine times nineteen, i.e. 7163, is the anchor for 2^13. Thereby fatality against real evil can be the essence of logic as a virtue of what we need to deal with, wince evil cannot enhance itself very much without it, although it really cannot avoid to deal with it as a virtue also for its (evil's) causes. ...

Logic (and thereby also math, don't you agree?) is, I believe now to be defined as a way of synchronizing what I've called homogeneity and 'plain evil' to simulate the softening of heterogeneous attitudes and to simulate skepticism against delusions and thus (at least sort of) also superficiality and what I've been calling plain evil, sort example in my list of the fifty-one first whole none-negative numbers. As can be found there; in numbers that 'plain evil' is twenty-nine, simply.

My assumptions about how such a simulation is done is by virtue of using similarities that are hidden by complexities and simplicity of surface-wise very different attitudes. That is one can pretend as if something about the in-between value of one more complex (higher) value and one less complex (lower) value. In this, the value in between the plain-evil value (29) and the homogeneity value (19) is 24, which can thus be simulated by them. The other simulation is between the specification targets of 29 and 19, i.e it's seven (between eight and six). Due to these two simulations logic renders smartness for also providing information of how the simulation targets can become reality. Thereby logic is not completely dedicated to being cynical. But it is cynical in its essence.

The in-between values inspire an assumption of both seven and twenty-four, inducing also twenty-four's main ingratiation step, to eighty-three. A seven and an eighty-three can together stand for the ingratiation step from 128 to 709, which is a resolute kind of consciousness, a type which relies on the issue of the harshness of what can be called "plain evil" when it is not set to be a clarifier of the necessity of disillusionment.

But there can also be disillusionment that is into pretension that one is opposed by immorality. When that happens, the spirit of plain evil can affect one's pretension to become worse. Also, to the extent that evil is rendered important by usage of humility clarity of moral within the disillusionment, that can potentiate that worsening! It is very difficult at times to know if opinions of others as immoral spring from such pretension or not. Apart from that, the disillusionment that is associated to utilitarianism, so that logic (if I'm right about my beliefs about how it works) can come to be, is (at least to the extent humility can also be part of it) support enough against that the disillusionment becomes destructive. Thereby, I think, it is perhaps only in situations  of circumstances of paranoia, prejudice and/or of selfish attitudes inclined for such pretension that logic is actually a bad thing.

Anyway, about as  -  or perhaps even more  -   importantly, the nineteen can establish an in-between value with twenty-one, which can thereby anchor thirty-two which in turn can make a meaning step that specifies twenty-nine. Perhaps this with in-between values seems unimportant; like why would it be exactly that? It might be that  because it is that that has the reality of a established preciseness, I believe, Because without such preciseness there is no trigger for the value found there (in-between) to be defined well enough to start working as such.

In that 24 is two times 12, it is an impurity of the delusion that twelve stands for, and thereby challenges delusions. This I have come to the conclusion renders tendencies of bitterness and so. But likewise twelve is an impurity of six which is an impurity of three, which I guess you imagine would lead to that the impurity in six is cured by second impurity into twelve. But twelve's anchor, for being consistent with everything, is six, which means that twelve tends not to restore three, after all, but instead to render it pathetic in that the would-be restoration of it does not yield to consistency.

It is also a bit troubling for me that it would seem to be that logic has something to do with homosexuality, or so  -  which it does not. Because I have on my page about sexuality described it as a counteract against the corrupt heterogeneity that might come into existence because of sex and so. But a basic difference is that any sexuality involves that an eleven is indulged in corrupting a seven, which almost cannot at all be the case with logic. Because intact homogeneity counteracts sexuality in that it targets the impurity of sex. It is the eleven of sexuality that is built upon impurity of three.