Wednesday, 27 January 2016

Groups of Meaning and Comparability or not

Due to us having one left and one right brain hemisphere, our brains can be assumed to work on creating an understanding from two main perspectives. Even if it isn't, one can assume there to be two main perspectives, as I will describe below. 

I think it can be a fairly okay, at least, assumption to say that there is one in the brain subjective/creative right hemisphere (which pertains to  the left body half) and one objective left hemisphere (which pertains to the right body half). What the difference is between these two main perspectives can of course be discussed in very many ways. But one simple and straightforward enough definition of that distinction can perhaps be to say that objective thinking emphasizes likenesses, while subjective/creative thinking emphasizes differences.

The perspectives of a two- or three- sided system of
comparison are not immediately compatible. 
About emphasising likenesses and differences, it can be an interesting topic to discuss what makes the difference between which type of such emphasis one uses. I hereby outline the three structures of it:

Firstly, one could have that everything falls into one and the same category; one is completely free from any dissociation or categorization what so ever. This sort of reasoning I believe is not exactly what one has to think about, though, I believe. Rather (or at least perhaps), it can be linked to our souls or so, I think. I very often refer to it as oneness; for reasons I have described at an earlier post, below.

Secondly, there can be the division into two main categories. But at least in the extreme of it two categories imply, I think, an uncompromising approach to everything, since there is no middle way to them. I mean, basically, that it implements pathological dissociation. But there is a version of two-categorical thought insinuated by the creativity and so in our right brain hemisphere that clears up, I believe, many of the dilemmas that such attitudes very often, otherwise could cause.

Thirdly, if one has a case of three categories, the would-be lack of middle-way approaches between two extremes is fairly easily solved, I think, simply by there being a third category possible for being that middle way, I think. That is, each of the three can  -  at least potentially  -  act as the in-between category about would-be discrepancies between the two others. This I believe perhaps even generally means that three sides of a categorisation structure compete about being able to meddle between the two other sides. There's a version, I think, of such thought in our left brain hemisphere, which can use such meddling for finding everything logically comparable or so.

Anyway, when it comes to more complex categorization structures than into just two or three categories, I believe there are always at least some notions of at least either two or three sides to the categorisation. This I have described a bit here, according to the rules I stand for that there can be about it. An important aspect of what there is to it, if you followed that link, is the issue of "meaning steps." Because such a step can group a number of simpler categorization structures into one, and/or emphasize again such a grouping made by an earlier meaning step.

The issue of meaning steps relates to giving  -  or insinuating  -  stability to multiple categorisations in one, in at least one step. The value given stability I call the prelude of the stability- (or "meaning-") -giving value. There is always at least one composite-number categorization structure that is a (direct or indirect) prelude to any none-composite, and more-than-three-category, structure. The very first such prelude always consists of structures of categorizations into two and/or three categories.

The way I view things in my attempted psychology, there generally is a more or less dangerous categorization structure has when one has six categories to it. Because the dissociation of categories that work independently of a third one and also of other two-categorical dissociation is too unlimited in its dissociation. But, with any structure where every two-categorical categorisation is grouped with other two-categorical categorisation, I think nature has solved that problem.

To make things very clear about this, the two twos of a four can be multiplied with another two, without that leading to wrong grouping; there still are only twos in that group of three twos. Something similar holds true for nine and three (twenty-seven), as well as sixteen and eight (128). It also holds true, I feel, even when one group, or two or several, of perspectives  are together as part of what I have described as a meaning step. Thus, neither ten, twenty or fifty-seven, for example, needs to represent an association that is wrongful about the essence of the perspectives that are part of it.

However, fifteen is not such a number, even so, because the meaning step uniting the two twos can show that it is they that actually belong together. It is only those numbers that stand for totally connecting factors that are unalike that cause dangerous illusions. Fifteen represents an illusion of sorts, but really not to say anything but an assumption of there being the potential illusion there in the ind of thinking that it represents. ... Thus, the meaning-step-based grouping of the two twos of  readily solves much of the problem of incompatibility between four and three.

But the direct combination of only one two-sided dissociation and then one or more three-sided ones is not solved so easily. Indeed, the two-sidedness in both six and eighteen remain incompatible even if insinuated only by meaning steps. That is meaning steps from six always emphasize the delusions or whatever that spring from the wrongful association of good (threefold) dissociation and bad (two-fold) dissociation as the same. Even the meaning step from the nine of an eighteen can't quite compensate against the delusions of a two  -  not without being grouped with another two.