Monday, 26 December 2016


Every new idea about how things work can be viewed as too speculative to be taken seriously. Do I have to say that so can my ideas? My guess is that: No, I don't!

But I use logic for my reasoning, both to begin with and also later on. Even so, kinda nobody believes I have a real good point to make! The reason for that is very certainly that I am not very thorough about presenting my ideas. ... And why is that, someone might ask.

One reason is that I simply have a lousy memory for that. Another is that there seems to be no one responding to what I say, and that I thereby ain't getting any feedback! the two together very easily produce a situation where I don't know what to tell people about them, my ideas.

I have, at points, tried to concentrate at making presentable points only. Somehow, though, doing so makes me less inclined to actually think for myself, enough to actually produce those points that I want to make. And, weirdly enough, nobody ever asks the right questions  -  or that's slightly exaggerated, but the truth is that it is (to say the least) quite rare for me that any one really quite does that at all.

Saturday, 19 November 2016

Worst-Case-Scenario Thinking

I have been supposing that consciousness springs from worst-case-scenario thinking. This is mostly because t seems likely that a worst-case scenario emphasizes a necessity of keeping track of one's thoughts. This being so, the worst-case thoughts need not themselves be conscious, though.

For thoughts or notions that provide a worst case to be more useful than destructive, one need to control them somehow and/or have them really reliant upon something they would otherwise destroy. To the extent that something is also a thought, one might suppose that it is clearer than most thoughts. It might thereby dominate thoughts of that type, the type that can be destroyed by the same type of tendencies. This seems similar to conscious thought.

If one presumes that thoughts rely upon balanced notions of what is what, that is in my number theory basically the same as that they rely upon five-based (or perhaps even four-based) notions. The five based notions (which are all also four based, though less directly, according to my system) include for example seven-based and ten-based ones´. The latter is simply because five is a factor of ten, and the former is because seven pertains to doing a meaning step from five.

Those meaning steps, which can also be called ingratiation steps, can also be used for enhancing whatever that is a meaning step from. That is a five enhances a four and a seven a five (and thereby indirectly also four). Likewise either a twenty-three or a but also a fourteen or forty-one can enhance ten. Within those meaning steps can be found different values, which can pertain to other qualities than those that the meaning steps enhance. Thereby one can in those meaning steps perhaps find those enhancements of potential destruction that seems to enhance its own destruction, and thereby perhaps, in the above-described sense, create dominant thoughts. ...

A seven and an eighty-three can together stand for the ingratiation step from 128 to 709, which is a resolute kind of consciousness, a type which relies on the issue of the harshness of what can be called "plain evil" when it is not set to be a clarifier of the necessity of disillusionment. The discipline of this  -  I think one might say consciousness of disillusionment  -  can be used both for authority and competing. It can also be used simply for getting enough exercise and so, with hardly any competitive spirit to it. At best, it also promotes fair play and so. ...

In a similar way, there is in the spiritual type (127 type) of discipline, there is an aspiration for utilitarianism or so. Thereby it is the reason for spiritual discipline of moral and so.That is, in the step from 32 to 127, there is a five factor, linked to a nineteen, the latter of which is utilitarianism, and the former of which is spirit. Terrifically enough it is a four and/or a five that can anchor that first meaning step for utilitarianism, from nine to nineteen. It is five that anchors it when a corresponding meaning step in the anchor itself is required for anchoring a meaning steps in its meaning series.

Tuesday, 11 October 2016


Religions are conscious systems for being and/or seeming trustworthy for specific or general contexts. For that purpose they tend to promote attitudes of benefit for those inclined for adequacy for reason about reasoning about religion. In that they are more or less iteratively self-promoting.

But there are other systems of ethics that do the above, I think. The difference seems to me to be that at the same time religions are also built upon emphasis-type seduction.But this type of seduction is probably only in the background, in the sense that it's what has established them to become popular in the sense they are. In the spirit of the religions themselves, that seduction is hardly appreciated (at least nowadays, I think). Instead there is a focus on their functionality for trustworthiness, as described above.

There are in the largest religions some examples of this, I think:
  • Christianity is the way I see it the most influential religion in this world. It is based on Judaism (which I will discuss later), a member of which tried, I think, to alter. But rather than altering his own religion he started a new one. Why, one might ask. My answer to that is that it is because he invented a soul beneficiary system of altruism for the sake of a soul, in which memory is spared from much criticism if it is inclined for such altruism.

    Later, it seems, probably about 500 AD or so, someone faked that such altruism should be influenced by a soul beneficiary system that indulges in exploiting utilitarian notions and thoughts for rendering soul ambition be self-sufficiently adequate for supremacy. In this the new religion turned against the Judaism from which it had sprung. Or the infiltration was perhaps earlier than I first thought, for example by roman emperor Constantine, as described here. Either way, I suspect, but I'm not sure, that those who believe very much in that form of Christianity are the Illuminati  - Right?!?

  • Because Judaism is, I believe, about one or two things. The very most basic one of them seems to be to have it utilitarianism aught to be of cunning that can sort out evils to be exploited for the benefit of (at least seemingly) everyone. But, my guess is with Moses or so, there came to it another soul beneficiary thought to it. This one seems to be about scrutinizing the spirit with remediation that leads to more remediation of it. This often  -  though not necessarily  - renders a spirit be more or less altruistic.

  • Islam I believe to be about scrutinizing, to some extent, about one or both of Christianity's two soul beneficiary systems, for the sake of also scrutinizing against clarity on how evil could stay peaceful.

  • Buddhims seems to be about letting utilitarianism exploit itself so that it can avoid being exploited by evil or so, in that it very much seems to lead to that utilitarianism has a notion of altruism to it.

  • Hindusim, from which Buddhism has sprung, seems to me to be about rendering utilitarianism self-sufficient about pertaining to supremacy.
What I above has called utilitarianism, I have in other contexts called homogeneity or so, and referred to it as a series of numbers that originate from nine, and continues with nineteen as its initial sense. What I there have called care for the soul or so, I have also often called other things, apart from moreover referred to as the series that starts from sixteen, with forty-seven as its initial sense.These mathematical expressions are much more of always the same, if I use them at al, while words and names can change a whole lot. ...

Friday, 7 October 2016

Logic and so

In my view of things, it is not without order that one can have a model for an absolute notion of something. There is in the order of logic  -  and numbers  -  an absolute notion of order itself. Furthermore, I think most will agree that rational numbers contain more order than irrational ones, and whole numbers even more. For this reason I have created the number system I present on this blog.

In this system,order itself can be more or less well defined. So far I haven't done it very well I'm afraid. But to it all comes that part of my belief, about how whole numbers work, is that the potential one factor in each of them can be of direct utilitarianism, two of broken such utilitarianism and three of broken such breakage of utilitarianism. Indeed, any plus sign between whole numbers is about a breakage, and each breakage can be about creating a new category. In this a one category, without breakage is about total utilitarianism of that direct kind. The potential one factor in any whole number can thus lead to a potential utilitarianism about the qualities of these whole numbers, and thus about the categorizations that they can create.

Order is sort of quite stringent already in threeness, destiny, since three has a discrepancy against discrepancy. Three to a power of two moreover evades the plain discrepancies. In the process both these anti-discrepancy tendencies are also anti-discriminatory. The result is thereby something like utilitarianism, in the sense that it brings back the one.

In the three of destiny there is however, an achorage of the third combinanation number, which is eight (after four and six). But eight, in being 2^3 reresents discrepency that spites three, because the connections between the two are anti-categorical. This spite against three, i.e. against the sureness of constant discrepency against discrapency must,  probably, be counteracted for achievement of strict logic.

But, in order to avoid that discrepency against discreency is ever only half-way, all good thoughts, include spirituality or utalitarianism (described here). But to usual thoughts, ther is also an imprtant element of saying to oneself that one is not sure. It is thereby that ordinary thoughts rely upon both sureness (by that discrepency is set to counteract itself) that spites unsureness, i.e. homogeneity (nine and what it preludes, such as nineteen), and also on discrepency that spites such sureness, thus yielding heterogeneity (eight and what it preludes, such as seventeen). In other words, the logic and imagination are intertwined and tolerate each other, making the logic not be strictlylogic.

Thereby I think logic is about such utilitarianism with a blatancy against what I've been calling heterogeneity (i.e. imagination and so). Sureness is in logic emphassized to be something better, more stable than imagination. Such emphasis is done with what I call a meaning step. It's the meaning step from eleven to twenty-nine that is closest at hand for such emphasis against three.

But, there's a problem with that, as ther eis also with cynicism! The eleven and the twenty-nine are part of the series of hardening discrepencies, i.e. of the second series, the one that starts from six. The six represents three and two viewed as sort of the same, i.e. simplification by discrepency as the same as discrepency against itself. This mixes sfe and unsefe assumptions in dangerous ways.

The second series also relates back to two, to inclininations of discrepency, including those that create injustice, and also those that create illusions. The second step of it, twenty-nine, hardens discrepency very much. Indeed I have been calling it plain evil.

I hope I use more of a ninetyone for the logic I try to achieve. That focus on eight, as two times four, is less cynical. I'm not sure, by now, however, how much can be used of what for what. ...

As I have had it before, logic is something of that has been somewhat distorted  -  by superficiality, or so. But now I believe that is not so. Rather that corruption of homogeneity is probably part of all sorts of sexuality that leads to promiscuous thinking and so, because that leads often also to corrupt homogeneity  -  including corrupt logic  -  and so.

It is not necessary for there to be any virtue for there to be logic. Also there should be no need for hypocrisy. Thereby  -  although it might seem weird to you in the beginning  -  the seduction into neglect should be done by association to the the simplest means for it, which happens to be what I have called 'plain evil'. See further where the seduction link in the last paragraph.

It is not needed for the 'plain evil' to be self-sufficient, for logic to work, I think   -  indeed I'm very sure I don't do it that way! To be sure logic works I just see to it that there is, at least sort of, an incitement for having to regard evil as quite possible. I also assume I can help myself to even so stay creative enough to see others' sides of situations and possibilities  -  potentially also, though absolutely not only, imaginary others. But this is because creativity can learn to adapt itself to be fairly good at surviving plain-evil-based corruption of it

But such corruption of heterogeneity can lead to not seeing the other side of that. The essence of such corruption is twenty-nine, which by its specification of heterogeneity (eight), which corrupts it from rendering it seem okay to pretend good is evil, of sorts. Because it is usually into having evil be into resurrecting itself to be good. This can be  -  at least somewhat well  -  seen in its structure of it as two to a power of three, interpreted as two that can counteract three (which stands for reciprocity) but that if that anti-three tendency is not relied upon for essential changes unless three itself is used to anchor it.

Anyway, twenty-nine is also an essence of enhancing prejudice. Homogeneity, in the sense talked about here, which is otherwise quite sophisticated against prejudice, annuls this essence to at least some extent. But in the process the utilitarianism-based positive attitude in homogeneity is annulled by the twenty-nine. Such an attitude can be seen in for example the religious systems that use enhancement of utilitarianism as their essence of enhancing trustworthiness and so.

A twenty-nine is severely counteracted, usually, most of all by that the basic specification against it is cruel; it is thirty-two, which is 2^5. Thereby it is hardly about five (spirit) at all, that the twenty-nine can be, upon being specified, in the most standard way, which (as is with standard specifications) is very commonplace. Thereby it is also commonplace to view essence of enhancing to be counteracted more or less easily when trying to do it by use of twenty-nine.

Due mostly to this, virtually only an at least sort of more or less self-specifying (i.e. memory-wise) twenty nine is smart at being able to be the essence it can be of enhancing prejudice, which although evil, I think, can be interesting as an issue. One indirect way of being memory wise for it is to specify the thirty two it can be specified by, which it can to together with a thirteen. That is twenty-nine specifies eight and thirteen four, which if put together as factors yields thirty-two. This specification by twenty-nine is the most dangerous prejudice enhancer there is.

It can be counteracted by logic, in that the essence of twenty-nine times nineteen works well against that a thirteen factor be active with a twenty-nine. This happens because thirteen times twenty-nine times nineteen, i.e. 7163, is the anchor for 2^13. Thereby fatality against real evil can be the essence of logic as a virtue of what we need to deal with, wince evil cannot enhance itself very much without it, although it really cannot avoid to deal with it as a virtue also for its (evil's) causes. ...

Logic (and thereby also math, don't you agree?) is, I believe now to be defined as a way of synchronizing what I've called homogeneity and 'plain evil' to simulate the softening of heterogeneous attitudes and to simulate skepticism against delusions and thus (at least sort of) also superficiality and what I've been calling plain evil, sort example in my list of the fifty-one first whole none-negative numbers. As can be found there; in numbers that 'plain evil' is twenty-nine, simply.

My assumptions about how such a simulation is done is by virtue of using similarities that are hidden by complexities and simplicity of surface-wise very different attitudes. That is one can pretend as if something about the in-between value of one more complex (higher) value and one less complex (lower) value. In this, the value in between the plain-evil value (29) and the homogeneity value (19) is 24, which can thus be simulated by them. The other simulation is between the specification targets of 29 and 19, i.e it's seven (between eight and six). Due to these two simulations logic renders smartness for also providing information of how the simulation targets can become reality. Thereby logic is not completely dedicated to being cynical. But it is cynical in its essence.

The in-between values inspire an assumption of both seven and twenty-four, inducing also twenty-four's main ingratiation step, to eighty-three. A seven and an eighty-three can together stand for the ingratiation step from 128 to 709, which is a resolute kind of consciousness, a type which relies on the issue of the harshness of what can be called "plain evil" when it is not set to be a clarifier of the necessity of disillusionment.

But there can also be disillusionment that is into pretension that one is opposed by immorality. When that happens, the spirit of plain evil can affect one's pretension to become worse. Also, to the extent that evil is rendered important by usage of humility clarity of moral within the disillusionment, that can potentiate that worsening! It is very difficult at times to know if opinions of others as immoral spring from such pretension or not. Apart from that, the disillusionment that is associated to utilitarianism, so that logic (if I'm right about my beliefs about how it works) can come to be, is (at least to the extent humility can also be part of it) support enough against that the disillusionment becomes destructive. Thereby, I think, it is perhaps only in situations  of circumstances of paranoia, prejudice and/or of selfish attitudes inclined for such pretension that logic is actually a bad thing.

Anyway, about as  -  or perhaps even more  -   importantly, the nineteen can establish an in-between value with twenty-one, which can thereby anchor thirty-two which in turn can make a meaning step that specifies twenty-nine. Perhaps this with in-between values seems unimportant; like why would it be exactly that? It might be that  because it is that that has the reality of a established preciseness, I believe, Because without such preciseness there is no trigger for the value found there (in-between) to be defined well enough to start working as such.

In that 24 is two times 12, it is an impurity of the delusion that twelve stands for, and thereby challenges delusions. This I have come to the conclusion renders tendencies of bitterness and so. But likewise twelve is an impurity of six which is an impurity of three, which I guess you imagine would lead to that the impurity in six is cured by second impurity into twelve. But twelve's anchor, for being consistent with everything, is six, which means that twelve tends not to restore three, after all, but instead to render it pathetic in that the would-be restoration of it does not yield to consistency.

It is also a bit troubling for me that it would seem to be that logic has something to do with homosexuality, or so  -  which it does not. Because I have on my page about sexuality described it as a counteract against the corrupt heterogeneity that might come into existence because of sex and so. But a basic difference is that any sexuality involves that an eleven is indulged in corrupting a seven, which almost cannot at all be the case with logic. Because intact homogeneity counteracts sexuality in that it targets the impurity of sex. It is the eleven of sexuality that is built upon impurity of three.

Thursday, 11 August 2016

Why Do We Feel that Something Is or Isn't Correct?

Correctness is about being error free (as described for example here and/or here  -  at least when I add this paragraph to this post, which is 170207). What is an error is nt always viewed as the same thing; one might say that it depends in the context what one means. But in general I think it's about being inconsistent with that context and/or with reality.

Consistency with reality is in one sense to be consistent with what one might expect from reality. That I have discussed here. But there might also be smaller parts of that consistency, which, according to what I wrte there, is about threeness, so to speak. That is one might expect that two and/or one could be equally important in that sense. The one factor is that in at least one sense, I think, as it can be seen as an invisible factor of anything. I mean that thereby it, like three is so much part of everything that one might view it as very much part of destiny.

Two cannot  -  as easily at all  -  be viewed as that much part of everything. However, all three of those simplicities, one two and three, still can be viewed as stable (as they are n more complex than three; as I described where the previous link leads to). In one sense, enhancing either one of those simple-enough-to-be-stable entities with flexibility, thereby, can be seen as an emphasis on correctness  -  as I have also discussed here.

Another thing I believe there could be to feelings of being error free can be to be into knowing to which extent there is a correctness or not. for this there can be a division into (what I in this blog usually call) homogeneity (i.e. logic and so) -inclined attitudes that associate decisively with (what I here usually call) heterogeneity (i.e. subjectivity and so)-inclined attitudes. That decisions is in numbers that 17 (heterogeneity's first meaning step) is multiplied with 19 (homogeneity's first meaning step). The resultant combination of numbers, the product 323, has its anchorage in the fundamental prelude for hypnotism by repression, which is 256=2^8. That is, mathematically (and by use of my system for defining thoughts and so in counting numbers), we have that 223 (=19*17) is the 256th establishment of counting-number products.

I believe that combination (though I doubt that it always needs to be that strict at all) to be a very important part of our minds' thought structures in general. It can be important, however to find ways to emphasize that combination without becoming too hypnotic about it. This I don't believe most people do.

It is a problem because since eight is the fundamental prelude for heterogeneity, it is much spited by that type of an anchorage. But since the first meaning step for that heterogeneity, together with with that for homogeneity are anchored in such hypnosis, one still looks for heterogeneity, but now only to the extent it can be viewed as meaningful. Concentration on being correct springs from sorting out the creative and subjective associations that don't have to be.

One might want to note that, since the 256 is a main target for sexuality, correctness is not very compatible with it. At least I feel so, about it. I also believe most people do! ... I believe it's because hypnotics overemphasize truth that it can't easily be counteracted without that resulting in counteracting truth as well. And truth is needed for the consistency that anchorage (as defined if you follow the link above) is about. Sexuality is not always as bad as the  hypnotism and so can be when it really is bad. But, rather, sexuality is not as harmless as just being into fairly modest control over the would be hypnotism and so of that 256, which really does do some, occasionally quite  -  or even extremely  -  serious, harm, sometimes, if one is not careful).

Monday, 18 July 2016

Is Everything about Math?

Scientists often tend to claim that mathematics is behind all  -  or at least, I think, they are often expected to. (Right?!) ... Anyway, I have had a friend, who was an artist, who claimed that spirituality and math were incompatible, that math was worldly, but not at all spiritual. I doubted his statements very much. But instead of arguing very much with him, I began pondering and contemplating upon the issue. Nowadays I feel very sure there is math, not only in the nature of worldly stuff, but also in the nature of spirits, notions and experience. I found, within myself, that belief in a number of units of something very well (as it seemed to me) could be described as a notion of how much it is appreciated that this something can be found to be realistic to the extent it needs to be. In later contemplation I formulated that a was like very much of God  -  or perhaps one could say the binding element between (perhaps all) godly or spiritual entities. I thereby sometimes call this binding element Oneness  -  not really quite to be confused with Christian or so notions of it. I am not certain that there is only one God, and I do not believe in Christ as a savior. ...

Even so, the Oneness that I believe in is basically very much that notion of that one is all and all is one  -  and thereby yields care for all and everything as if one. ... Two represents a breach against this, a spite  -  putting it mildly  -  against that notion. Three represents a breach against that type of a breach, which resurrects such care for all, basically. This I have written some more about here. To the extent you need me to define what math itself is to be defined as in my counting-number framework, this can be the link to that.

Thursday, 19 May 2016

Is This Framework Usable for Practical Purposes?

I have while developing the concepts of it, found it useful for analysis of certain aspects of our reality  -  with ourselves and/or with our environment and so. I have also tried to apply the framework on other things. I have, as of yet, just listed a few examples of potential uses for it here.

Monday, 11 April 2016

When a Number of Categories Can and Can't Reflect an Attitude

With or without regard for what number of subjects or objects someone deals with, the way that person perceives and then conceives his or her environment is, as far as I can tell, very likely to yield to potential categorization into certain numbers of categories.In this blog I am trying to ascertain what such categorization structure of an interpretation, conception or expectation can say about an attitude that the conception can pertain to.

There we have basically, that with infinity connected to each and every category, if the number of such categories is:
  1. then we have that, since infinity includes everyone and everything, everyone and everything is included and categorized as one and the same. As a consequence, anyone using one infinite category must care for everyone and everything in order to care for it-, her- or himself.
  2. then the individual that pertains to the categorization has an infinity of exclusion from the first category. This determines that those excluded from care will seen as infinitely inadequate or bad or so. 
  3. then the third such category pertains to an infinite exclusion from both the prior two categories. It is possible to do this without there being a contradiction by not yielding at all to either extreme, but be infinitely neutral. This means the third category neutralizes any decision except those already pertinent to either of the other two categories. This, in turn, seems to mean that pertinence to a category must be real. With the pertinence to the destruction category, thereby, will come destruction, and with pertinence to the care category will come care, because one belongs to the category where everyone else is destructive or caring, respectively. 
  4. Now, and from here on, there is no new absolute categorizations to be done! Thereby, every new category pertains to an infinite possibility of making oneself pertinent to deviance from the absolute notion of infinity being that everything is the same. This can be done in an infinite number of different ways, and one new way comes with every new category added!

My supposition is that an attitude or belief generally can be thought of as much related to a categorization structure of expectation or potential attitude can be raised questions about. Because, I know, that if one pertains merely to ordinary categories, then it is very true that a person can yield to one, two, three, four - or whatever number - of categories for any observation, without that reflecting much of what that person's attitudes towards the observed are. That is, I feel and believe, like many many others, just part of life's variations, and does not deal with what we are about, but just what number of categories we have at hand.

But: It is not true - at all - that I have ever meant that any categorization that there is to how one perceives and/or conceives an object is relevant for interpretation according to my system of understanding what those categories say about attitudes. It is sort of exactly categorizations that include an aspect of what I call oneness that is what I am about when I yield to interpretations of numbers as indicators of attitudes, and that, to the extent it doesn't, can be defined as categorizations of that all and everything that such oneness stands for. That is, everything imaginable should be part of the notion (or so) that is categorized.

It is thereby not at all categories in that sense when for example a representative of a store talks for example about the different types of articles the store sells. Neither can it ever quite (at the very least not very easily) be that, I think, when someone speaks of the different types of pastimes that this someone might pertain to. Because it is not at all about trying to categorize among what is already categorized from all and everything, i.e. from oneness.

There can be something of the type of categorization that I mean when one feels there isn't anything outside those categories. In that, there is in at least one of the categories a notion of infinity connected to it., so that all and everything  -  imaginable  -  is part of that whole structure. Other categories can sometimes thereby be viewed (more or less easily) as exceptions from unity with all and everything. (I think it's not at all always, however, that the same categories stands for the connection to all and everything. I'm fairly sure of it. Because probably some categorization structures can be inclined to alter their emphasis of that aspect between categories.) Apart from potential connections to infinity also include general categorizations, to be viewed as total as to infinity. Thereby I feel the type of categories I mean can be defined as either connected to infinity or, to the extent they aren't that, as exceptional in not pertaining to it.

Still, the categories should remain categorical in the sense that pertinence to one category implies exclusion from the others no matter what. I mean that what one category stands for has elements of impertinence to both each and every other category per se, but also to whatever the combination of the other categories stands for. Thus, with three categories, the third one stands for having it the exclusiveness between the two others is impertinent, but still to some other exclusiveness from each of them. ... I think this needs to hold true no matter which one of the categories is viewed as the third one.

That quality, by the way, that any category can be viewed as the third one, also should basically pertain to the second and the first one as well. Moreover, in larger numbers it should also pertain to the forth and fifth ones and so on. That is the categories should not in every sense have to be in a specific order. At the same time, though, they should be applicable also to structures of order, such as time order. This type of potential, but  not necessitated, interchangeability of the order within the structure is another criterion for the categorization to fit into my theory about when it can say much about an attitude. 

All in all it is basic and fundamental categorization structures that it is about. It is about fundamental that the structure involves something of all and everything, in at least one category. It is about fundamental and also about basic that the categories are adaptable to there being order (of for example time) or not to them. 

People have reacted to my attempted demarcation of the type of categories I mean. Some, it seems now, have come up with that they could be called exploration categories or so. This I feel is adequate and also that it does describe what I was doing when I first began sensing it all, as described in this later post of mine (which is, however not later than that it too might for all I know also be behind that people have found that name for the type of categories I'm after). I suppose I might change what I call them in this blog too, eventually. ...

Sunday, 28 February 2016


In psychology, the meaning of the word dissociation is usually a bit specific, as described for example here. There it deals mostly, I think, with how a person perceives and relates to him or herself and to his or her environment. Dissociation, in the latter meaning of the word, is viewed as pathological to the extent, I think, that it is unrestrained, basically.

But, in cognitive neuropsychology and even in cognitive psychology in general the word refers, usually, to something different, namely brain damage that causes specific dysfunction. That is, some brain functions stay intact, while one or more others are harmed. This is very often used for testing which brain functions affect which tasks.

I have a forth sense of the word: I feel it is about interpretations of reality and/or some certain context, in two or more exclusive ways (two or more categories of dissociation). Generally I feel that many of those ways can be very subtle, though. If it is into only two ways, including more or less subtle ones, then it generally can mean into one pro- and one anti- way.

I actually feel that the context of a dissociation can be defined in many ways. It might, I think, for example be one of the dissociations described by psychology. It can even be one of the brain functions being turned on or off, in the sense that the person with that handicap cannot relate to reality as if there when it's about whatever that functionality is about. Dissociation from one's past or one's present in general or in certain contexts can fairly easily be defined like that, I think, since it is about exclusively being anti- present or past and pro- the other one of them.

So it seems that dissociation can in psychology in general be interpreted as a division into extremes of pro- and anti-functional or so. In my interpretation, there's something to it that says that the functional parts could  -  to at least some extent  -  influence the others into functioning too, unless they have them defined as dysfunctional, which I hereby define as that they tend to dissociate from them. Further, if at least one sides of one's interpretation of reality define another one as dysfunctional, and also sets that to be a self-fulfilling prophesy, then the dissociation is for real, I feel.

But to the extent there' a third side to that dissociation, then it should consequently define the other two as dysfunctional, it seems, and also even set that to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. This I believe goes to unlimited extremes, theoretically, when there are only two parts to such a dissociation. This means, though, that a third-part dissociation means also dissociating from dissociating without limits, I think. So, thereby, with a simple third part to it, a dissociation tendency can limit itself. ...

Perhaps this can be interpreted as a main reason for there being security against too much dissociation in any context. I mean that perhaps in nature there exist very much of such three-part dissociation. ...

Wednesday, 27 January 2016

Groups of Meaning and Comparability or not

Due to us having one left and one right brain hemisphere, our brains can be assumed to work on creating an understanding from two main perspectives. Even if it isn't, one can assume there to be two main perspectives, as I will describe below. 

I think it can be a fairly okay, at least, assumption to say that there is one in the brain subjective/creative right hemisphere (which pertains to  the left body half) and one objective left hemisphere (which pertains to the right body half). What the difference is between these two main perspectives can of course be discussed in very many ways. But one simple and straightforward enough definition of that distinction can perhaps be to say that objective thinking emphasizes likenesses, while subjective/creative thinking emphasizes differences.

The perspectives of a two- or three- sided system of
comparison are not immediately compatible. 
About emphasising likenesses and differences, it can be an interesting topic to discuss what makes the difference between which type of such emphasis one uses. I hereby outline the three structures of it:

Firstly, one could have that everything falls into one and the same category; one is completely free from any dissociation or categorization what so ever. This sort of reasoning I believe is not exactly what one has to think about, though, I believe. Rather (or at least perhaps), it can be linked to our souls or so, I think. I very often refer to it as oneness; for reasons I have described at an earlier post, below.

Secondly, there can be the division into two main categories. But at least in the extreme of it two categories imply, I think, an uncompromising approach to everything, since there is no middle way to them. I mean, basically, that it implements pathological dissociation. But there is a version of two-categorical thought insinuated by the creativity and so in our right brain hemisphere that clears up, I believe, many of the dilemmas that such attitudes very often, otherwise could cause.

Thirdly, if one has a case of three categories, the would-be lack of middle-way approaches between two extremes is fairly easily solved, I think, simply by there being a third category possible for being that middle way, I think. That is, each of the three can  -  at least potentially  -  act as the in-between category about would-be discrepancies between the two others. This I believe perhaps even generally means that three sides of a categorisation structure compete about being able to meddle between the two other sides. There's a version, I think, of such thought in our left brain hemisphere, which can use such meddling for finding everything logically comparable or so.

Anyway, when it comes to more complex categorization structures than into just two or three categories, I believe there are always at least some notions of at least either two or three sides to the categorisation. This I have described a bit here, according to the rules I stand for that there can be about it. An important aspect of what there is to it, if you followed that link, is the issue of "meaning steps." Because such a step can group a number of simpler categorization structures into one, and/or emphasize again such a grouping made by an earlier meaning step.

The issue of meaning steps relates to giving  -  or insinuating  -  stability to multiple categorisations in one, in at least one step. The value given stability I call the prelude of the stability- (or "meaning-") -giving value. There is always at least one composite-number categorization structure that is a (direct or indirect) prelude to any none-composite, and more-than-three-category, structure. The very first such prelude always consists of structures of categorizations into two and/or three categories.

The way I view things in my attempted psychology, there generally is a more or less dangerous categorization structure has when one has six categories to it. Because the dissociation of categories that work independently of a third one and also of other two-categorical dissociation is too unlimited in its dissociation. But, with any structure where every two-categorical categorisation is grouped with other two-categorical categorisation, I think nature has solved that problem.

To make things very clear about this, the two twos of a four can be multiplied with another two, without that leading to wrong grouping; there still are only twos in that group of three twos. Something similar holds true for nine and three (twenty-seven), as well as sixteen and eight (128). It also holds true, I feel, even when one group, or two or several, of perspectives  are together as part of what I have described as a meaning step. Thus, neither ten, twenty or fifty-seven, for example, needs to represent an association that is wrongful about the essence of the perspectives that are part of it.

However, fifteen is not such a number, even so, because the meaning step uniting the two twos can show that it is they that actually belong together. It is only those numbers that stand for totally connecting factors that are unalike that cause dangerous illusions. Fifteen represents an illusion of sorts, but really not to say anything but an assumption of there being the potential illusion there in the ind of thinking that it represents. ... Thus, the meaning-step-based grouping of the two twos of  readily solves much of the problem of incompatibility between four and three.

But the direct combination of only one two-sided dissociation and then one or more three-sided ones is not solved so easily. Indeed, the two-sidedness in both six and eighteen remain incompatible even if insinuated only by meaning steps. That is meaning steps from six always emphasize the delusions or whatever that spring from the wrongful association of good (threefold) dissociation and bad (two-fold) dissociation as the same. Even the meaning step from the nine of an eighteen can't quite compensate against the delusions of a two  -  not without being grouped with another two.