The decoding of to can; I believe pertain to what I've been calling specification, which points to it as more or less context specific. In order for such encoding to become a memory, I believe that the context must guarantee some auto-relevance for it. That is, the encoding needs to be into a context that feeds back to the memory itself.
A categorization structure that pertains to a specification (of that kind) of it's own prelude, I believe to hold the capacity of memory; it can be regarded as a memory handler, I feel. This means (also) that it is of a tendency (which can easily be for example a thought) that can preform self-specification, thereby keeping itself specified enough to be consistent with itself. It is also fairly resistant to being specification (as unimportant) by something else, because its own specification of itself usually competes well enough with outside competition for it to stay rather intact. This becomes true at least sooner or later, I think, upon one procedure or more of what I guess one might view as consolidation of that memory.
Categorization structures of numbers (of categories) that very much are examples of such self-specification (thereby, I believe, enabling one to consolidate memories) are thirteen and forty-three, each of which thereby representing a stable type of memory (long-term memory, that is, I think). Thirteen specifies a four, which can be viewed as a prelude, and thus an essential part, of five, which (in the same way) is an essential part of seven, which (in the same way) is an essential part of thirteen itself. Thirteen thus always implies itself, and thus memory. And so does forty-three, which specifies a twelve. Because the four in a twelve is an essential part of the five in a fifteen, and fifteen is an essential part of forty-three.
Probably, there are also indirect memories (partly or fully indirect). One of those is when a nineteen specifies a six to set a thirty-one to specify nineteen's own nine (which is an essential part of nineteen). The nine can also contain a one factor that can potentially help a thirteen specify the nineteen's remaining ten factor. Another one that pertains to nineteen is that the unspecified thirteen in it can initiate that seventy-three emphasizes a twenty-two's specification of nineteen. Nineteen itself is with its nine moreover able to initiate specification of that remaining thirteen, yielding one more composite self-specification, i.e. memory.
By the way, if an attitude A inspiring another attitude B into specifying attitude A, then attitude A is altruistic, in the sense that it inspires B to remember it. Of course one might say that the attitude B might pertain to the same person who attitude A springs from. But there being another attitude there opens the way for there being another person there too, very much so, even. Because while attitude A can, if targeting itself, avoid those who don't pertain to it, attitude B isn't inclined to avoid those that don't pertain to attitude A, unless the attitudes are specified, in one way or another, belong together. ... Inspiring memories in others (or attitudes that can more easily pertain to others than to oneself) that complete memories about oneself (that can most easily pertain to oneself), causes something that is in-between altruism-based and egocentric memory, which one might call humility-based, I feel.
Caring for memory - in others - to be important is - I imagine - about trying to be potential benefit for whoever that is whom one wants to remember. In other words it is - in a sense - about altruism, I think, even in a secondary sense. I'll try to elaborate more on this later. ...
But now back to the mentioned numbers that specify themselves to form different types of memories. Those of thirteen can be called personal wisdom or so. Those that have to do with forty-three I have chosen to call circumstantial memories, because the involve very much the person in five and the karma in three, which are the factors of its very essential part fifteen. The third memory number that I have mentioned is basically about tangible memories - or at least pertains more or less exclusively to theoretical knowledge, because the two threes in a nine no longer very much (if even at all) are about karma, in that they avoid the reality of hardship in problems that might arise. I believe this can yield that the (for nineteen very essential-part nine) focuses basically always on the total knowledge rather than emphasising the problems per se.
The memories, that pertain to calculators, computers and so are very likely to be of the type of nineteen that I have mentioned where its specified six is used as a prelude for specification of thirty-one to specify the nine that is an essential part of that nineteen. The nine can stand for whatever knowledge is stored. The nineteen, can stand for the knowledge in a (meaningful, or so to speak) context and can also serve as an important part of the memory holder's context (perhaps of knowledge about how to handle that memory; but I feel there's some reason to believe that for this type of memory storage, there is not really knowledge, just data, sort of). That is, the meaning steps from twelve to thirty-one equals nineteen, which thus can can use the memory has inspired about itself.
In a brain's memory, homogeneity (which tends to give rise to for example logic, I think) is, I believe, mostly stored in a different way, namely that of completing its initial specification (of potential mistakes, or wrongs, one could say) with inspiring a forty-seven's (faith's) specification of its remaining part, thirteen. Similarly, memory of heterogeneity is, I believe, remembered by empathy's own specification (of the spirit of being there in that situation or dream or so) completed with inspiring a forty-three's (circumstantial memory's, that is) specification of its remaining part, twelve. I've described this and written a bit more about this at the page about memory holders.
Another memory of the brain is very likely to to use the combination of the specifications of its homogeneity inclination, and the that of its heterogeneity inclination, together can specify an eleven. It, the eleven, plays an important part in anchoring both thirty one, which specifies nine, i.e. prelude homogeneity, and also sixty-seven, which specifies seventeen. Thirty-one is anchored prelude focus on the six, which is what homogeneity itself targets, yielding, I think, better capacity to create tangible memory independently in the brains homogeneity hemisphere. Sixty-seven's focus on the whole seventeen anchors with prelude focus on the whole eleven, so that, it seems. Thereby the heterogeneity hemisphere takes help from the homogeneity hemisphere for memories to be tangible. Even so, it seems, I think, that the sixty-seven tends to virtually always cause certainty in remembrance - perhaps, I think, due to that it tends that strongly (perhaps?) to establish something of a seventeen in itself. Either way, it seems very likely to be because the sixty-seven targets the whole seventeen that heterogeneity memory, abstract as it may be, gives a full picture memory, while homogeneity memory (because of the focus on the prelude homogeneity) focuses on details of memory!
As another example of memory is the forty-one, which is a type of heterogeneity, can use its natural focus on eleven, and its on three to simulate its own prelude, fourteen. It can also take another - more indirect - stands for remembrance, which is to use its target of specification, eleven, to anchor sixty-seven, which in turn anchors 127, the specification of which, twenty-nine, specifies eight, the prelude of heterogeneity in general. Moreover, the rest of the forty-one (thirty-three) is specified in parts by the forty-one's focus on eleven and the eleven's focus on three.
Some other forms of memory pertaining to feelings and so can, I suppose, usually be viewed as aesthetics or so. There are actually very many more forms of memory too, I believe - even infinitely many! But I can't describe them all, of course.