My answer has to do with that within the five categories, there lurks a subgroup of four categories, which is in a sense not a categorization of its own accord, and should thereby hardly be viewed as part of the full five of them. These are thereby reduced into only four, but four which are not into the divisibility with two that an ordinary group of four categories is.
|The forth category not counted, a fifth takes it's place.|
It can thus, I feel, be viewed as a living.version of four (See also here). Seven can likewise be viewed as containing the essence of five, since disregarding four and six (which are composite) as none-real constituents, the seven has five left. Eleven can in the same sense be the living version (or essence, perhaps) of six - and likewise thirteen of seven, seventeen of eight, nineteen of nine, twenty-three of ten and twenty nine of eleven - and so on. Seven can also be viewed as the second-step essence of four, and twenty-nine can of six.
To some extent, one may say to oneself that there wouldn't have to be an essence of meaning, or so, for there to be emphasis on that certain combination of categorisations (i.e. of dissociation into for example 2*2=4, 2*3=6, 2*2*2=8, etc., categories). ... I think one may say about those so-to-speak essence levels, or meaning steps or whatever, that they are into something at least a little bit like what prägnanz is about in gestalt psychology, i.e. grouping in order to simplify (about that, you might look for example here) and thus make the conception and remembrance easier of some variety of objects or phenomena. That is, one might in a similar way group one's own dissociation structures, which thus form new ones. As prägnaz groups supposedly are conceived more easily if they are grouped by for example similarities, as can other groups of one's conceptional preferences. And as I have discussed above, at a later post, my theories, too, say that conceptional understanding probably is more trustworthy to the extent those group objects are comparable.
If so, we have that there is meaning, in the sense of cognitive shortcuts and so, to the extent the groups are alike, which seems likely. But there is, if so, (at least in that sense) not meaning to what I have called meaning steps, if they spring from six (see also here). But with the meaning steps from eight and nine, for example, there is. ...
Either way, I believe that there's not very easily activity to anything, less there's at least one meaning step to it. This I'm not completely sure about. But it does seem to me that one, two or three categories per se could not activate the potential to search for an answer to why, or to which extent, there's meaning to dealing with an issue.
Either way, a meaning-step number can be viewed, I believe, as a summary of the essential of the qualities represented by its prelude. If, as with for example seven, the prelude is also a prelude, then there's a second meaning-step level, and an indirect prelude there. The number of steps between the prelude and the essence can, I believe, relate fairly well to categorisation structures of that number of categories. This I have discussed here.
Another assumption I make about how these things work is that a meaning step tends to stabilize its influence on a prelude. This does not mean, I think, that the two very steadily stick together - more than sort of. That is, they can break apart, and the meaning-step influence can move to a new prelude and concentrate on that one for a time. Five can in the context be viewed, I feel, as a spirit, which can be both the spirit that makes you a person, but thereby also potentially the spirit of beliefs, which that spirit can pertain to one at a time. That is you as a person, or I as one, can spirit up, so to speak, one belief at a time.
After that it can move to yet another one, and then again, and then again. Each and every time the influence on the earlier preludes stays important, for eternity, probably - I think.
Either way, with procedures of removing interest from composite categorisations, the only numbers that don't change (at least in magnitude) are one, two and three. Three being the greatest of those sort of, I think, means that three, and thereby reciprocity (see also or example here),is more or less an essence of every meaning step. In that three involved, reciprocity is (if you follow that link). There is a certain tendency for it to have to establish itself as the essence of emphasising the rest of the basis for the attitude. That is, behind the basis of any attitude there is a certain tendency of cunning for emphasising reciprocity as the exact opposite of the remaining part of that basis. If, as with five, the basis is four, then the remaining part (that is not the reciprocity part) will be one, since four minus three is one. Emphasising this, about whatever that remnant part is, very much marks it as indifferent to absolute reciprocity. I.e. the remnant part of that basis is to be seen as an independent unit of none-karma-based existence. However, at the same time, karma is the basis of the order of everything, since it works by dismissing dismissal of what there can be of good for that order as well as for order in general. In other words, it is not by order of reciprocity that one can have it one is special, but it is by the emphasis of it as being the opposite of karma, which at the same time sort of tends to more or less challenge its very existence, though. ... This I have also discussed a bit here.