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Friday, 15 August 2014

For Viewing Something as Intrinsic to Nature and so

I have earlier described oneness as Godly and relatively safe to have as a security, for everyone. In order for that kind of helpfulness not to be too helpful for those who dissociate others from it, destiny, and so also pertains to trinity, one might say, and thereby be into reciprocity about such dissociation.Being able to do so, I consider to be inert to usage of three-categorical thoughts. Using three categories for one's judgements is other words, I think, the essence of corrective capacity.

Because, reciprocity against bad dissociation can get at badness, I think, not only in the sense of badness that means evil, but also badness that means lousy. Because lousiness per se is much about not testing one's assumptions, attitudes and so. A simple test of such things should be to let them  -  in one way or another  -  get at themselves to the extent they are bad, i.e. to have them be reciprocal and thereby stop or destroy or so themselves before  doing that to other elements of one's conception.

Indeed, it is by emphasis on the correctness of three-category-based notions that one can point to other notions as inadequate for correctness. Pointing something out such a way I have defined as specifying that something as uninteresting and so. To some extent, one can point to three-category notions themselves, but one cannot, I believe, for it use anything more correct than it is itself.

In nine (= three times three) categories, three spites two: We can find a discrimination against discrepancy in another way as well, namely that the two threes that are in union can establish themselves as independent co-factors.as long as they ignore possibilities of division into two.Evasion of this seems to purify the three form the blind discrimination of two. But at least potentially, I think it also makes three less efficient against such discrimination or less inclined for clarity on what it is about. Since three is into homogeneity and two is against it, I believe that three to a power of two yields important types of homogeneity, which I have described more here.

I believe that nine categorical thought actually also tends very often to specify especially about illusions and so (represented by six), by use of a participation in nineteen that is there by the first meaning step from nine. Sort of like with simple three-category notions, exactly, there is (I think) to those of nine categories  -  and thereby also to those of nineteen, or even any meaning steps further from there  -  a quality of inert correctness that can't very much be specified as inadequate for correctness, or so. I guess that nine's quality of spiting two makes its three-based notions rather theoretical about things that are associated with two-based notions. ...

One might imagine there's an total contradiction in twenty-seven, with its three factors of three, since it's thereby about three avoiding itself. But what happens is that the threes really become flexible and versatile about how to establish themselves. The twenty-seven's three-wise flexibility of itself, I think probably gives rise to feelings of coziness. But there is also distinct risk to this kind of an attitude in that there is no absolute in the three's form of justice, although there is also a sort of gain for justice in that the three capacity can be flexible.

To twenty-seven categories, meaning steps can be done in more than one way. Firstly it could directly include all the twenty-seven's three factors. Secondly it could firstly include only two of them, one or more times. Upon applying a meaning step on only two factors, the third one might be included for one or more additional meaning steps. About twenty-seven, as with nine, categories, there is an essence of correctness still more or less intact, which holds true, I think, with or without meaning steps to it.

Categorization into eighty-one categories is like nine (its square root), but more thoroughly spiteful against using exactly two (basic) categories. When it's into two hundred and forty-three categories it's into counteracting the spirit for the sake of what three can stand for. Seven hundred and twenty-nine categories is a bit like a nine and a bit like a twenty-seven. ... and so on by the same rules.

By the way, I think it should be mentioned that every categorization structure with more than one factor to it, involves something of that factor's potential to it. This is especially true if that factor in turn has co-factors of that the product categorization structure also has. This is discussed at the third point in a list at this post. 

Basis for Power to Be Free

The simplest way to have a self, I think, should be to have exactly one I category and one others category. That is one could have an initial expectation built on usage of exactly two categories. I say that is can sort of be the extremely basic way of tending for the self that there can be.

Such categorisation into only two expected categories yields evasive dismissal of what there is in using one category, leaving a semi-complete care-for-all (i.e. oneness) ability in only the other one. This happens because of negligence and/or ignorance. The second category can stand for those one ignore or avoid caring for, while a first one stands for those one care for. Doing this with total dogmatism is very simple-minded and dogmatic. In fact, using only two categories like that probably would have to mean total and simple-minded egotism, too much even for the self to survive, I suspect.

The evil and simplicity of this can be, however, and is in our ordinary personal beings, I think, counteracted by being more or less anti-dogmatic about it, perhaps by dismissing such dismissal, which can probably be done in more than one basic way. One way is to dismiss it for the sake of completing the oneness (which takes three categories). The other type is to dismiss it for the sake of another categorization structure. This mathematically becomes the number of categories to that structure, that number, to the power of two. This is so because the structures are different, just as addition is different from multiplication. That is, in very simple contexts, in an immediate sense, one needs to spite the addition in order to yield the multiplication, sort of. Below, I try to exemplify this second type of structure-based spite against using two basic dissociation categories. If you follow this link, I have tried to describe an example of three spiting two, which implies both types of spite against plain two-category structures.

The way I view things, usage of two to a power of two, i.e. four, categories (which I believe tends to yield dismissal of dismissal for the sake of dismissal  -  in a way that leaves some, but not all dismissal free from being dismissed, i.e. achieving a balanced dismissal, I think) is anti-dogmatic in a good sense. It becomes that by being about more or less conflicting causes as equally worth it. They thus never quite subdue one another, which I think would be the ordinary quality of a simple two-category dissociation of causes. Instead, they simply subdue the blatant nature of one another, and thus (since in order to subdue any basic and total two categorical dismissal tendency, one must subdue general possibility of dismissing so totally) subdue generally such tendencies of total blatancy of dismissal. It follows that the anti-totality of dismissal cannot easily be totally dismissed, but that there is in its nature to stand for modesty that hardly can be beat totally.

About four-categorical thoughts or notions (or so), I believe it yields itself to enough humility to the components of discrimination for them to change, basically into a belief (or perhaps a meme), which doesn't discriminate blindly, but instead discriminates only enough to be separate from all and everything. That is, I believe that with such discrimination of humility, one can state one's beliefs without there being any problem of trying to be too powerful, which there (at least sort of, I think) is with only a two-category thought. Still there is the potential to keep on discriminating, though softly, for as long as that four is there at all, I think. Probably, I think (but I feel less sure of it, though), there must also be that very same constellation of twos there, for the same belief to be presented in a good enough way. But, I believe, in the four itself, there's not the notion of an entity, just two entities of discrimination that happen to interact together to form something that can (I think) be defined as a belief.

Making this humility keep on functioning can be found in an essence of a meaning step, from it (from four to five, and then perhaps also from five to seven and so on, if you've understood what I've written were the link leads to). Five, the first meaning step from four, is very much about integrity and stands for a personal interest  -  or perhaps rather a spirit of enthusiasm for a belief  -  or so. Such an enthusiasm can, I believe, disguise itself as libido, or so, I think. This it is especially good at when anchoring a tendency of homogeneity, to its first meaning step. As can be seen from all the links (leading to my own accounts on the issue), the topic has been discussed further elsewhere  -  and I will thus not discuss it further here.

Back to basics, it seems likely for me that a belief (four categories)   -  or to some extent to a spirit of belief (five categories; one meaning step from belief)  -  tends to alternate between experiences, which can form the notion of the belief, (or spirit) of it, as actual about more than one context. The experiences are thereby both in there each by itself, but still somehow can represent the attitudes of one another. This can more or less, I think, fool everyone into believing someone capable enough of such alternation not quite inclined to do something that person does do, because the double nature of the belief. Such trickery I can find to be an alternation females are more capable of than men, because females have it in their X-chromosome structures (X inactivation, which I think I have discussed a little here). But, anyway, to the extent that a belief has a second meaning step to it, upon the one that yields its spirit or so, what that second meaning step yields can  -  I feel  -  be called the soul of that belief. Such a second step changes the affect on an experience from being into an alternation as described above to being a real mixture of experiences. Even so, though, if one has, for example, an experience of a personal memory then a belief held about it can alternate one's way of viewing that memory, so that it doesn't tend to be overly dogmatic, I think. reasons described

The above-described four-based heterogeneity is a heterogeneity of cause not to be confused with heterogeneity of interpretation, which pertains to eight and is described below. It is, I think, by use of both these types of heterogeneity that one can be a person, in that one can have one's personality in the notions that form in the structures of would-be contradictions. It is thereby that personality is anti-dogmatic. It is from there one can yield ones freedom of thought.

If one adds yet another factor of two to a four (or a five), thus yielding an eight (or ten) then we have a version of spite, against using three categories this time. Since the eight (or so) always has a factor of four (or so), it always involves a potential for (or so), as is described on this post. But, even so, the new two insinuates discrimination-based spite against what three stands for. However, this type of discrimination yields also that three categories will always sort of be insinuated, by that eight is the third type of composite categorization structure, after four and six, which are the first and second, respectively. I.e. three of the categories there are to an eight is the same type of categorization structure as eight itself. This yields that three anchors the meaning series that stars at eight, the meaning series of heterogeneity of interpretation.

I seems, then that it thus has a natural connection to three and thus an essence of relying upon it, which means, I think, that it gets flimsy (or so) without it, I think. This balances out, I believe, that the structure of an eight is probably into that a two shouldn't relate to three categories as good to have in the three sense, because of the three twos in its structure having to relate to each other in another sense. If I'm right, then eight can thereby stand for anti-dogmatism of justice without having to risk justice very much at all, but still provide one with the possibility of escape from too much dogmatism of justice.

To the extent that the heterogeneity of interpretation does not pertain to being consistently into that it matters that it pertains to three in being the third composite-type category structure, there is also something else that tends much to soften it from becoming very dangerously spiteful. This is that there actually is another, more effective, even, way of yielding an extra set of two categories to a four. This is by use of the spiritual competence of supporting the soul with that the spirit should  -  necessarily  -  not be determined for the simple two-factor, but instead should only use it to exemplify itself, basically. Such spiritual competence is described by a seven-category structure.