Sunday, 21 December 2014

Attitudes that Establish other Attitudes

Here are different types of establishment of other attitude that I can describe in numbers
  • A very effective establishment of another value that stands for an attitude can be done by specifying it for contexts that also support its existence (for example) by meaning steps. Alternatively the value that species and the thereby specified value can be linked directly for cooperation, the kind of link that in according to the rules presented in this blog of mine is symbolized by a multiplication of those two values. But that is not necessary when that value is represented by meaning steps, as with memory and/or with that the specifier and meaning-step supporter are otherwise connected. The latter very often gives rise to what human beings find to be memory, but not always, I think.
  • One form of simulation and establishment of other attitudes is described in this post about sexuality. As is described there, it is about doing it between preludes and follow-ups, of consistency (the way those words are described if you follow that link). A key to that functionality is that eleven can specify three, and twenty-nine an eight, something which also can be done by thirty-five and ninety-one, respectively. The latter two can function that way too, but they are not as effective against the types of hypnotism that sexuality can get at, I believe. Moreover, they cannot simulate each other by those means, since they are not connected by consistency, as twenty-nine and eleven are, so that those (last-mentioned) two can simulate each other simulating the other. ...
  • Another type of it I have described here. I believe this type of establishment of an in-between-value attitude cannot quite be done  -  at least nor effectively  -  without some form of help to it. I believe such help can be easily found, in one form of hypnosis or another, though it is not always available at any time. I believe it's not needed with very much hypnosis at all, so it is fairly easily done for those who are skilled to do it I think.
  • A third kind is basically about that one can view a notion of something that is multiplied to the extent that it is the only factor as something that is consistent with the notion of (for example) using only one such factor. That is a number of categories that is consistent with two can be used as a two. Thus a four factor of an eight can to some extent be viewed as a two, and that eight thus as a four (to some extent). That eight can also count as a two itself. Also, a five can be used as a two the same way as four can, since it it has four as its prelude, and a seventeen as a five and a two, the same way as an eight count as a four and a two. Likewise an eighty-one can be seen as a three, a nine and as a twenty-seven. The same rule holds true with all positive-integer bases and exponent, that is with all categorization structures (bases) that spite other categorization structures.(exponents).
  • One can also establish one attitude as another by use of specification (see link above) of the difference between the two attitudes. This can be done naturally to the extent the attitude to the establishment of another is consistent with establishing such a specification. Some such specifications can very much be keys to our different states of happiness.
  • Moreover, there can be other manipulation of things, by use of ,more or less hypnosis, which can be used for different types of hiding one attitude in another, or so. ...

Friday, 12 December 2014


For forming a memory one tends (according to modern theory) to first encode it and then store it, so that it later can be retrieved. The encoding id, I believe done by anything that is into life being for real. In the number sense of this blog, being into that means basically just pertaining to a whole number  -  or at least if it's a positive whole number.

The decoding of to can; I believe pertain to what I've been calling specification, which points to it as more or less context specific. In order for such encoding to become a memory, I believe that the context must guarantee some auto-relevance for it. That is, the encoding needs to be into a context that feeds back to the memory itself.

A categorization structure that pertains to a specification (of that kind) of it's own prelude, I believe to hold the capacity of memory; it can be regarded as a memory handler, I feel. This means (also) that it is of a tendency (which can easily be for example a thought) that can preform self-specification, thereby keeping itself specified enough to be consistent with itself. It is also fairly resistant to being specification (as unimportant) by something else, because its own specification of itself usually competes well enough with outside competition for it to stay rather intact. This becomes true at least sooner or later, I think, upon one procedure or more of what I guess one might view as consolidation of that memory.

Categorization structures of numbers (of categories) that very much are examples of such self-specification (thereby, I believe, enabling one to consolidate memories) are thirteen and forty-three, each of which thereby representing a stable type of memory (long-term memory, that is, I think). Thirteen specifies a four, which can be viewed as a prelude, and thus an essential part, of five, which (in the same way) is an essential part of seven, which (in the same way) is an essential part of thirteen itself. Thirteen thus always implies itself, and thus memory. And so does forty-three, which specifies a twelve. Because the four in a twelve is an essential part of the five in a fifteen, and fifteen is an essential part of forty-three.

Probably, there are also indirect memories (partly or fully indirect). One of those is when a nineteen specifies a six to set a thirty-one to specify nineteen's own nine (which is an essential part of nineteen). The nine can also contain a one factor that can potentially help a thirteen specify the nineteen's remaining ten factor. Another one that pertains to nineteen is that the unspecified thirteen in it can initiate that seventy-three emphasizes a twenty-two's specification of nineteen. Nineteen itself is with its nine moreover able to initiate specification of that remaining thirteen, yielding one more composite self-specification, i.e. memory.

By the way, if an attitude A inspiring another attitude B into specifying attitude A, then attitude A is altruistic, in the sense that it inspires B to remember it. Of course one might say that the attitude B might pertain to the same person who attitude A springs from. But there being another attitude there opens the way for there being another person there too, very much so, even. Because while attitude A can, if targeting itself, avoid those who don't pertain to it, attitude B isn't inclined to avoid those that don't pertain to attitude A, unless the attitudes are specified, in one way or another, belong together. ... Inspiring memories in others (or attitudes that can more easily pertain to others than to oneself) that complete memories about oneself (that can most easily pertain to oneself), causes something that is in-between altruism-based and egocentric memory, which one might call humility-based, I feel.

Caring for memory  -  in others  -  to be important is  -  I imagine  -  about trying to be potential benefit for whoever that is whom one wants to remember. In other words it is  -  in a sense  -  about altruism, I think, even in a secondary sense. I'll try to elaborate more on this later. ...

But now back to the mentioned numbers that specify themselves to form different types of memories. Those of thirteen can be called personal wisdom or so. Those that have to do with forty-three I have chosen to call circumstantial memories, because the involve very much the person in five and the karma in three, which are the factors of its very essential part fifteen. The third memory number that I have mentioned is basically about tangible memories  -  or at least pertains more or less exclusively to theoretical knowledge, because the two threes in a nine no longer very much (if even at all) are about karma, in that they avoid the reality of hardship in problems that might arise. I believe this can yield that the (for nineteen very essential-part nine) focuses basically always on the total knowledge rather than emphasising the problems per se.

The memories, that pertain to calculators, computers and so are very likely to be of the type of nineteen that I have mentioned where its specified six is used as a prelude for specification of thirty-one to specify the nine that is an essential part of that nineteen. The nine can stand for whatever knowledge is stored. The nineteen, can stand for the knowledge in a (meaningful, or so to speak) context and can also serve as an important part of the memory holder's context (perhaps of knowledge about how to handle that memory; but I feel there's some reason to believe that for this type of memory storage, there is not really knowledge, just data, sort of). That is, the meaning steps from twelve to thirty-one equals nineteen, which thus can can use the memory has inspired about itself.

In a brain's memory, homogeneity (which tends to give rise to for example logic, I think) is, I believe, mostly stored in a different way, namely that of completing its initial specification (of potential mistakes, or wrongs, one could say) with inspiring a forty-seven's (faith's) specification of its remaining part, thirteen. Similarly, memory of heterogeneity is, I believe, remembered by empathy's own specification (of the spirit of being there in that situation or dream or so) completed with inspiring a forty-three's (circumstantial memory's, that is) specification of its remaining part, twelve. I've described this and written a bit more about this at the page about memory holders

Another memory of the brain is very likely to to use the combination of the specifications of its homogeneity inclination, and the that of its heterogeneity inclination, together can specify an eleven. It, the eleven, plays an important part in anchoring both thirty one, which specifies nine, i.e. prelude homogeneity, and also sixty-seven, which specifies seventeen. Thirty-one is anchored prelude focus on the six, which is what homogeneity itself targets, yielding, I think, better capacity to create tangible memory independently in the brains homogeneity hemisphere. Sixty-seven's focus on the whole seventeen anchors with prelude focus on the whole eleven, so that, it seems. Thereby the heterogeneity hemisphere takes help from the homogeneity hemisphere for memories to be tangible. Even so, it seems, I think, that the sixty-seven tends to virtually always cause certainty in remembrance  -  perhaps, I think, due to that it tends that strongly (perhaps?) to establish something of a seventeen in itself. Either way, it seems very likely to be because the sixty-seven targets the whole seventeen that heterogeneity memory, abstract as it may be, gives a full picture memory, while homogeneity memory (because of the focus on the prelude homogeneity) focuses on details of memory!

As another example of memory is the forty-one, which is a type of heterogeneity, can use its natural focus on eleven, and its on three to simulate its own prelude, fourteen. It can also take another  -  more indirect  -  stands for remembrance, which is to use its target of specification, eleven, to anchor sixty-seven, which in turn anchors 127, the specification of which, twenty-nine, specifies eight, the prelude of heterogeneity in general. Moreover, the rest of the forty-one (thirty-three) is specified in parts by the forty-one's focus on eleven and the eleven's focus on three.

Some other forms of memory pertaining to feelings and so can, I suppose, usually be viewed as aesthetics or  so. There are actually very many more forms of memory too, I believe  -  even infinitely many! But I can't describe them all, of course.

Thursday, 18 September 2014

For Supporting an Attitude as Meaningful

Dissociation into some number of categories, where that number is a multiple or multiples of two or three, fairly clearly consists of dissociation into that number (two or three) of categories, as well as whatever that two or three is a multiple of. Thus it consists of at least two simpler categorizations. In a sense, thereby, it is not much of  a categorization of its own accord. This can be especially true, perhaps, if one means that dissociation hardly has any more than three categories. But, then of course, one might ask: What happens with for example five categories to a dissociation?

My answer has to do with that within the five categories, there lurks a subgroup of four categories, which is in a sense not a categorization of its own accord, and should thereby hardly be viewed as part of the full five of them. These are thereby reduced into only four, but four which are not into the divisibility with two that an ordinary group of four categories is.

The forth category not counted, a fifth takes it's place.
In the same way all other none-prime numbers can be viewed as a buildup of constituents, and thereby not consistent with anything much that is newer than those constituents. I.e. it can be viewed as none-real to some extent. That is the four first, in this sense essential, categories are one, two, three and five.

It can thus, I feel, be viewed as a living.version of four (See also here). Seven can likewise be viewed as containing the essence of five, since disregarding four and six (which are composite) as none-real constituents, the seven has five left. Eleven can in the same sense be the living version (or essence, perhaps) of six  -  and likewise thirteen of seven, seventeen of eight, nineteen of nine, twenty-three of ten and twenty nine of eleven  -  and so on. Seven can also be viewed as the second-step essence of four, and twenty-nine can of six.

To some extent, one may say to oneself that there wouldn't have to be an essence of meaning, or so, for there to be emphasis on that certain combination of categorisations (i.e. of dissociation into for example 2*2=4, 2*3=6, 2*2*2=8, etc., categories). ... I think one may say about those so-to-speak essence levels, or meaning steps or whatever, that they are into something at least a little bit like what prägnanz is about in gestalt psychology, i.e. grouping in order to simplify (about that, you might look for example here) and thus make the conception and remembrance easier of some variety of objects or phenomena. That is, one might in a similar way group one's own dissociation structures, which thus form new ones. As prägnaz groups supposedly are conceived more easily if they are grouped by for example similarities, as can other groups of one's conceptional preferences. And as I have discussed above, at a later post, my theories, too, say that conceptional understanding probably is more trustworthy to the extent those group objects are comparable.

If so, we have that there is meaning, in the sense of cognitive shortcuts and so, to the extent the groups are alike, which seems likely. But there is, if so, (at least in that sense) not meaning to what I have called meaning steps, if they spring from six (see also here). But with the meaning steps from eight and nine, for example, there is. ...

Either way,  I believe that there's not very easily activity to anything, less there's at least one meaning step to it. This I'm not completely sure about. But it does seem to me that one, two or three categories per se could not activate the potential to search for an answer to why, or to which extent, there's meaning to dealing with an issue.

Either way,  a meaning-step number can be viewed, I believe, as a summary of the essential of the qualities represented by its prelude. If, as with for example seven, the prelude is also a prelude, then there's a second meaning-step level, and an indirect prelude there. The number of steps between the prelude and the essence can, I believe, relate fairly well to categorisation structures of that number of categories. This I have discussed here.

Another assumption I make about how these things work is that a meaning step tends to stabilize its influence on a prelude. This does not mean, I think, that the two very steadily stick together  -  more than sort of. That is, they can break apart, and the meaning-step influence can move to a new prelude and concentrate on that one for a time. Five can in the context be viewed, I feel, as a spirit, which can be both the spirit that makes you a person, but thereby also potentially the spirit of beliefs, which that spirit can pertain to one at a time. That is you as a person, or I as one, can spirit up, so to speak, one belief at a time.

After that it can move to yet another one, and then again, and then again. Each and every time the influence on the earlier preludes stays important, for eternity, probably  -  I think.

Either way, with procedures of removing interest from composite categorisations, the only numbers that don't change (at least in magnitude) are one, two and three. Three being the greatest of those sort of, I think, means that three, and thereby reciprocity (see also or example here),is more or less an essence of every meaning step. In that three involved, reciprocity is (if you follow that link). There is a certain tendency for it to have to establish itself as the essence of emphasising the rest of the basis for the attitude. That is, behind the basis of any attitude there is a certain tendency of cunning for emphasising reciprocity as the exact opposite of the remaining part of that basis. If, as with five, the basis is four, then the remaining part (that is not the reciprocity part) will be one, since four minus three is one. Emphasising this, about whatever that remnant part is, very much marks it as indifferent to absolute reciprocity. I.e. the remnant part of that basis is to be seen as an independent unit of none-karma-based existence. However, at the same time, karma is the basis of the order of everything, since it works by dismissing dismissal of what there can be of good for that order as well as for order in general. In other words, it is not by order of reciprocity that one can have it one is special, but it is by the emphasis of it as being the opposite of karma, which at the same time sort of tends to more or less challenge its very existence, though. ... This I have also discussed a bit here.

Monday, 1 September 2014

Simplest Is First, Usually, in Nature

Complexity usually takes time. Thereby a simple happening is more easily the first influence on other happenings in nature. Thus, the order from the simplest to the more and more complex can be viewed as rather natural order of priority. The same thing surely holds true about things that fall into the same natural category (natural here meaning that they are naturally comparable, even without manipulation) at least about their complexity.

I feel that the video to the right reveals a somewhat different perspective from the one I started out with when I began contemplating on my mathematics.In one sense sense, it shows, I think, that the importance of one is not only about oneness, but rather how the ideas that exist in one individual is important in a context of a potential power surge or so. Such things I have discussed a little here. The notion of an individual being is the start of something that spreads is the notion, mostly of fiveness, so to speak (five basically being the notion of a spiritual self). The notion of power of one individual over another, who might be the one who has such ideas that might spread and thus become important, eventually can be found for instance in seventeen, as described if you follow the link above. In the song, however, I think, is portrayed also something of a notion of that libido, or os, takes over now and then, from the notion of oneness, or spirit  -  or so.

Friday, 15 August 2014

For Viewing Something as Intrinsic to Nature and so

I have earlier described oneness as Godly and relatively safe to have as a security, for everyone. In order for that kind of helpfulness not to be too helpful for those who dissociate others from it, destiny, and so also pertains to trinity, one might say, and thereby be into reciprocity about such dissociation.Being able to do so, I consider to be inert to usage of three-categorical thoughts. Using three categories for one's judgements is other words, I think, the essence of corrective capacity.

Because, reciprocity against bad dissociation can get at badness, I think, not only in the sense of badness that means evil, but also badness that means lousy. Because lousiness per se is much about not testing one's assumptions, attitudes and so. A simple test of such things should be to let them  -  in one way or another  -  get at themselves to the extent they are bad, i.e. to have them be reciprocal and thereby stop or destroy or so themselves before  doing that to other elements of one's conception.

Indeed, it is by emphasis on the correctness of three-category-based notions that one can point to other notions as inadequate for correctness. Pointing something out such a way I have defined as specifying that something as uninteresting and so. To some extent, one can point to three-category notions themselves, but one cannot, I believe, for it use anything more correct than it is itself.

In nine (= three times three) categories, three spites two: We can find a discrimination against discrepancy in another way as well, namely that the two threes that are in union can establish themselves as independent long as they ignore possibilities of division into two.Evasion of this seems to purify the three form the blind discrimination of two. But at least potentially, I think it also makes three less efficient against such discrimination or less inclined for clarity on what it is about. Since three is into homogeneity and two is against it, I believe that three to a power of two yields important types of homogeneity, which I have described more here.

I believe that nine categorical thought actually also tends very often to specify especially about illusions and so (represented by six), by use of a participation in nineteen that is there by the first meaning step from nine. Sort of like with simple three-category notions, exactly, there is (I think) to those of nine categories  -  and thereby also to those of nineteen, or even any meaning steps further from there  -  a quality of inert correctness that can't very much be specified as inadequate for correctness, or so. I guess that nine's quality of spiting two makes its three-based notions rather theoretical about things that are associated with two-based notions. ...

One might imagine there's an total contradiction in twenty-seven, with its three factors of three, since it's thereby about three avoiding itself. But what happens is that the threes really become flexible and versatile about how to establish themselves. The twenty-seven's three-wise flexibility of itself, I think probably gives rise to feelings of coziness. But there is also distinct risk to this kind of an attitude in that there is no absolute in the three's form of justice, although there is also a sort of gain for justice in that the three capacity can be flexible.

To twenty-seven categories, meaning steps can be done in more than one way. Firstly it could directly include all the twenty-seven's three factors. Secondly it could firstly include only two of them, one or more times. Upon applying a meaning step on only two factors, the third one might be included for one or more additional meaning steps. About twenty-seven, as with nine, categories, there is an essence of correctness still more or less intact, which holds true, I think, with or without meaning steps to it.

Categorization into eighty-one categories is like nine (its square root), but more thoroughly spiteful against using exactly two (basic) categories. When it's into two hundred and forty-three categories it's into counteracting the spirit for the sake of what three can stand for. Seven hundred and twenty-nine categories is a bit like a nine and a bit like a twenty-seven. ... and so on by the same rules.

By the way, I think it should be mentioned that every categorization structure with more than one factor to it, involves something of that factor's potential to it. This is especially true if that factor in turn has co-factors of that the product categorization structure also has. This is discussed at the third point in a list at this post. 

Basis for Power to Be Free

The simplest way to have a self, I think, should be to have exactly one I category and one others category. That is one could have an initial expectation built on usage of exactly two categories. I say that is can sort of be the extremely basic way of tending for the self that there can be.

Such categorisation into only two expected categories yields evasive dismissal of what there is in using one category, leaving a semi-complete care-for-all (i.e. oneness) ability in only the other one. This happens because of negligence and/or ignorance. The second category can stand for those one ignore or avoid caring for, while a first one stands for those one care for. Doing this with total dogmatism is very simple-minded and dogmatic. In fact, using only two categories like that probably would have to mean total and simple-minded egotism, too much even for the self to survive, I suspect.

The evil and simplicity of this can be, however, and is in our ordinary personal beings, I think, counteracted by being more or less anti-dogmatic about it, perhaps by dismissing such dismissal, which can probably be done in more than one basic way. One way is to dismiss it for the sake of completing the oneness (which takes three categories). The other type is to dismiss it for the sake of another categorization structure. This mathematically becomes the number of categories to that structure, that number, to the power of two. This is so because the structures are different, just as addition is different from multiplication. That is, in very simple contexts, in an immediate sense, one needs to spite the addition in order to yield the multiplication, sort of. Below, I try to exemplify this second type of structure-based spite against using two basic dissociation categories. If you follow this link, I have tried to describe an example of three spiting two, which implies both types of spite against plain two-category structures.

The way I view things, usage of two to a power of two, i.e. four, categories (which I believe tends to yield dismissal of dismissal for the sake of dismissal  -  in a way that leaves some, but not all dismissal free from being dismissed, i.e. achieving a balanced dismissal, I think) is anti-dogmatic in a good sense. It becomes that by being about more or less conflicting causes as equally worth it. They thus never quite subdue one another, which I think would be the ordinary quality of a simple two-category dissociation of causes. Instead, they simply subdue the blatant nature of one another, and thus (since in order to subdue any basic and total two categorical dismissal tendency, one must subdue general possibility of dismissing so totally) subdue generally such tendencies of total blatancy of dismissal. It follows that the anti-totality of dismissal cannot easily be totally dismissed, but that there is in its nature to stand for modesty that hardly can be beat totally.

About four-categorical thoughts or notions (or so), I believe it yields itself to enough humility to the components of discrimination for them to change, basically into a belief (or perhaps a meme), which doesn't discriminate blindly, but instead discriminates only enough to be separate from all and everything. That is, I believe that with such discrimination of humility, one can state one's beliefs without there being any problem of trying to be too powerful, which there (at least sort of, I think) is with only a two-category thought. Still there is the potential to keep on discriminating, though softly, for as long as that four is there at all, I think. Probably, I think (but I feel less sure of it, though), there must also be that very same constellation of twos there, for the same belief to be presented in a good enough way. But, I believe, in the four itself, there's not the notion of an entity, just two entities of discrimination that happen to interact together to form something that can (I think) be defined as a belief.

Making this humility keep on functioning can be found in an essence of a meaning step, from it (from four to five, and then perhaps also from five to seven and so on, if you've understood what I've written were the link leads to). Five, the first meaning step from four, is very much about integrity and stands for a personal interest  -  or perhaps rather a spirit of enthusiasm for a belief  -  or so. Such an enthusiasm can, I believe, disguise itself as libido, or so, I think. This it is especially good at when anchoring a tendency of homogeneity, to its first meaning step. As can be seen from all the links (leading to my own accounts on the issue), the topic has been discussed further elsewhere  -  and I will thus not discuss it further here.

Back to basics, it seems likely for me that a belief (four categories)   -  or to some extent to a spirit of belief (five categories; one meaning step from belief)  -  tends to alternate between experiences, which can form the notion of the belief, (or spirit) of it, as actual about more than one context. The experiences are thereby both in there each by itself, but still somehow can represent the attitudes of one another. This can more or less, I think, fool everyone into believing someone capable enough of such alternation not quite inclined to do something that person does do, because the double nature of the belief. Such trickery I can find to be an alternation females are more capable of than men, because females have it in their X-chromosome structures (X inactivation, which I think I have discussed a little here). But, anyway, to the extent that a belief has a second meaning step to it, upon the one that yields its spirit or so, what that second meaning step yields can  -  I feel  -  be called the soul of that belief. Such a second step changes the affect on an experience from being into an alternation as described above to being a real mixture of experiences. Even so, though, if one has, for example, an experience of a personal memory then a belief held about it can alternate one's way of viewing that memory, so that it doesn't tend to be overly dogmatic, I think. reasons described

The above-described four-based heterogeneity is a heterogeneity of cause not to be confused with heterogeneity of interpretation, which pertains to eight and is described below. It is, I think, by use of both these types of heterogeneity that one can be a person, in that one can have one's personality in the notions that form in the structures of would-be contradictions. It is thereby that personality is anti-dogmatic. It is from there one can yield ones freedom of thought.

If one adds yet another factor of two to a four (or a five), thus yielding an eight (or ten) then we have a version of spite, against using three categories this time. Since the eight (or so) always has a factor of four (or so), it always involves a potential for (or so), as is described on this post. But, even so, the new two insinuates discrimination-based spite against what three stands for. However, this type of discrimination yields also that three categories will always sort of be insinuated, by that eight is the third type of composite categorization structure, after four and six, which are the first and second, respectively. I.e. three of the categories there are to an eight is the same type of categorization structure as eight itself. This yields that three anchors the meaning series that stars at eight, the meaning series of heterogeneity of interpretation.

I seems, then that it thus has a natural connection to three and thus an essence of relying upon it, which means, I think, that it gets flimsy (or so) without it, I think. This balances out, I believe, that the structure of an eight is probably into that a two shouldn't relate to three categories as good to have in the three sense, because of the three twos in its structure having to relate to each other in another sense. If I'm right, then eight can thereby stand for anti-dogmatism of justice without having to risk justice very much at all, but still provide one with the possibility of escape from too much dogmatism of justice.

To the extent that the heterogeneity of interpretation does not pertain to being consistently into that it matters that it pertains to three in being the third composite-type category structure, there is also something else that tends much to soften it from becoming very dangerously spiteful. This is that there actually is another, more effective, even, way of yielding an extra set of two categories to a four. This is by use of the spiritual competence of supporting the soul with that the spirit should  -  necessarily  -  not be determined for the simple two-factor, but instead should only use it to exemplify itself, basically. Such spiritual competence is described by a seven-category structure.

Monday, 14 July 2014

Complexities of the Self

Firstly should be mentioned that every categorization structure with more than one factor to it, involves something of that factor's potential to it. This is especially true if that factor in turn has co-factors of that the product categorization structure also has. This is discussed at the third point in a list at this post.

While two to a power of something less than four results in being into oneself as a person with integrity (see here for what I mean), or power to be oneself; there is pitfall (or so to speak) about that in that there is in using sixteen categories of choice to ones thoughts. To its mathematical structure, there is a 2^2^2, meaning two steps of inhibition two, by two itself. That is, something (such as three, as described here, or two itself, as described here) to a power of two once inhibits basic categorization into two parts by opposing that relations between equal parts should be into categorically separated units.But it does not tend to be very through about this, as it is only once that it points to such categorization as bad. Pointing to it twice that way, as with sixteen (and for example eighty-one), yields tendencies to counteract it more thoroughly.

As two itself can be viewed as evil, counteracting it quite thoroughly generally tends to call for there to be over-belief in whatever the number (or numbers, which works, though it is a bit less efficient) that is there in the four factors for it. But when, as with sixteen, that number is two itself, then two counteracts itself twice, which I think leads us to believe in two-ness as a disproof of itself. ...

The attitude that springs form using thirty-two categories can be defined, it seems to me, rather differently. It must, I believe, stand for something of cruelty. against the spirit. It can (when using a meaning step to a hundred and twenty-seven) possess what a twenty-nine stands for if you look at this list. But although its ability to object to empathy and imagination (in general, and specifically about the other side of things), and also, but to very little extent to the seven-with-twenty-nine ability to possess sixteen. Because the seven can annul belief in anything directly cruel, such as the thirty-tow (=2^5), except to the extent that it is based on absolute godliness. That it can be to the extent the thirty-two continuation 127 is completed by oneness so that the resultant 128 is partly based on oneness, meaning it can repress actions of the seven to save the twenty-nine.

About sixty-four category attitudes, anyway, I think they could be viewed as having a precarious attitude about love and hate, because there is then not deal with trying to help oneself understand what evil there is to be seen, since 2^6 blocks out most basic evils. As to a hundred and twenty-eight categories, it is to be seen as totality of ruthlessness of cruelty. Possibly, also, one can also define it as cruel evil, because it basically is that, too  -  to the extent that it doesn't pertain to being anti- the next type, two hundred and fifty-six categories, which very very dangerous. It is so because it dismisses clarity about dangers, and to some extent even individual freedom, and thus turns attempts for justice into evil or awkward aspirations. Basically, usage of 256 categories thereby tends to weaken ones defenses against two-category-based thoughts and notions so much that it evilly surfaces evil as the only solution to ignorance.

Mathematically 256 is (2^2^2)^2 = 2^(2^3), the first of which yields that it spites two with itself enough for there to be ignorance of what two stands for, and thus power for it. What's on the right side of that equal sign yields that power is not seen as a mistake as it would be by heterogeneity, eight (=2^3).

With any number of two-factors to a categorization (including the above) a rule to it is that there's so-to-speak attempted termination of the simpler categorisations into that number of categories.
Also, I can say that the two hundred and fifty-six categorical aspects of reality are in themselves the totally extreme pitfalls of reality that are very awful. They are evil in the sense that they don't pertain to actually admitting there's any problem to the extent one hasn't realized one, due to that they ruin one's capacity for imagination about both problems and otherwise. They are thus also extremely dangerous, if they come to effect. The lack of imagination they cause is evil of hypnotic power in a very bad sense.

To all this comes a notion of a total dominance without interfering too much with the notion of what is going on in the relationship between one form of integrity and its square root. Thus, the 16, which is the square root of 256 is very important for our survival for eternity. However, also, the four that is its square root is also crucial, very importantly so. The reason the two cannot become crucial is that it has no continuation, whereas four has five, then seven (and so on), and sixteen has 47 and 199 and so on.

Saturday, 8 February 2014

Diversity Is Semi-Guaranteed by Need for Sexual Reproduction

We have, as everyone knows, two genders, i.e. two systems for building up sexual solutions to problems that would hinder reproduction of our kind. It is sort of guaranteed that reproduction cannot happen by intercourse between two females  -  and not even not by two males; that is, it is not as things are today, possible to reproduce sexually without two genders involved. See also here about that. ... This i say although it is not as far as I can see it impossible at all that science will eventually create female sperm or so. Because  -  probably, I think  -  it is far from the only way to view things to have it that they then can reproduce in a way that guarantees (or perhaps we should say semi-guarantees, if you followed that link above) what the diversity of the two genders does.

I believe that the difference between the two genders is in their two ways of creating possibility/-ies of insights into why possessive and destructive powers, which are 256-based, can possess one for an eternity forward  -  or could, actually, had it not been for among other things our possibility of being sexual against it. This is due to that sexuality uses the spirit of 256-category processes in order to possess and infiltrate the power of possession itself. The female way of doing this is rather sophisticated compared to the male way, which is rather straight-forward. I.e. the 259 arrogance about the equality-based power over eternity being set to oppose the 256 is clearly linked to the 203, which is primarily to be found in the Y-chromosome. That is 259 is the 203rd combined categorization. But, there is in the Y-chromosome also a catch, which is very anti-hypnotic, and which thereby stops both the 29 in the 203 itself and simultaneously also the hypnotism of the first learning-step competence, (i.e. 1613 categories). When there is 203 without that hypnotism-stopping adequacy, that's when religious people really aught to (and they usually do) start talking bout "the devil". Because the attitude caused by that fairly simple combination in itself is very seductive and extremely much into that any loyalty should be really only towards oneself. ... It can exist both in male and female malfunction sex-chromosomes, but also in other places in our universe. It is not to be reckoned with as a smaller danger than trying to be seductive in the first place, but without attempting to scare the seduced person, because that is what they all say is very sufficient for both the devil and God - right?!

The X-chromosomal essence is indirectly linked to to 259 =7*37. That essence is most importantly into being about the 143 =13*11, which is one category more than the number linked to even 185 =5*37. To this comes, though that the 143 is about being sarcastic against vanity for precision in that the combined eleven and thirteen together target humility and thus also arrogance against precision (which is a secondary realization from the one about the humility, which in turn realizes the real essence of all arrogance, which the 143 thereby can use to imply backward steps as to its own number of categories). To this comes the two- and fourness of the female build of two mutually X-chromosomes, which, by essence of being into being exclusive (i.e. each of the two X-chromosomes turn its counter-X-chromosome of), tends strongly to reject connecting itself with one-step learning, but not two- or four-step learning. Thereby it tends, to the extent it can, to transform the five in the 185 to a seven, thus creating a 259 from the 185. Moreover, it can, because it involves a oneness which can formulate itself in a way which pertains to starting up a seven, by being into defining the two-smart attitude of oneness to be a shelter for the two-smart attitude of a seven. In the process, the 143 can by its backward steps' qualities also add significance to its own virtues which can thereby compensate for lost own virtues of capacity. In this the 143 can triumph over the 203 by simulating all its competences, (not very exactly as much, but still just about) to the extent it offers its own for that. For this it uses its own thirteen and eleven for simulating seven and upon that the in-between value doubled seventy-one which it can control for voluntary completion of the eleven to twenty-nine, simultaneously. It is not highly safe to assume that this can always be done or so, but it still can work very well at times. I really feel that can't (at least as of yet) guess anything about when it does to which extent or so, though.